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NEDC further alleged heat discharges from the mill by BPHC's
predecessor, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. ("Smurfit"), violated the terms
of a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit.
BHPC argued the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim under the
CWA. BHPC claimed NEDC failed to allege constitutional standing
requirements, specifically a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact
fairly traceable to the challenged actions of BHPC. Further, because
NEDC alleged only specific violations by Smurfit in its complaint,
NEDC failed to provide BHPC sufficient notice under the CWA.
Finally, BHPC argued NEDC had no cause of action under Oregon
Revised Statutes section 468.025 (1) (b), as no provision created private
enforcement of the statute.
The court found NEDC's complaint alleged sufficient injury-in-fact
based on the group's professed interest in the health of fish in the
Willamette River. The court found NEDC also provided BHPC
sufficient notice, as NEDC's complaint specifically alleged BPHC
violated the CWA by discharging waste heat into the river.
Information regarding Smurfit's prior, identical operation merely
clarified NEDC's allegations. BHPC argued NEDC's notice did not
allege specific dates on which BPHC violated the CWA, and was
therefore insufficient. However, BHPC took possession of the mill on
May 9, 2000, and NEDC sued on June 26, 2000. Thus, the court found
the notice effectively alleged BPHC's violations within a relatively short
time, and was therefore sufficient.
The court dismissed NEDC's claims under Oregon Revised Statute
section 468.025(1) (b) because, where a statute is silent on private
enforcement rights, a court considers private claims only when
necessary to carry out state policies.
In this case, Oregon's
Department of Environmental Quality enforced the statute, thereby
precluding NEDC's claims. The court granted NEDC leave to amend
its complaint, and to plead the claim as a common-law tort.
Alan Curtis
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Equilon Enters., L.L.C. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g granted, 21 P.3d 758 (Cal. 2001) (holding:
(1) dismissal of plaintiff oil company's action against consumer group
under California's "SLAPP" statute was proper where consumer
group's notices of intent to sue under Proposition 65 (formerly know
as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986) fell
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within the type of speech or right to petition protected by the "SLAPP"
statute; and (2) declaratory relief was not appropriate since oil
companies were unlikely to prevail on their claims, and Consumer
Cause was absolutely privileged).
On October 14, 1998, Consumer Cause gave notice of its intent to
sue Shell Pipeline Corp. ("Shell"), Texaco, Inc., the state Attorney
General, the Los Angeles County District Attorney, and the Los
Angeles City Attorney for alleged violations of Proposition 65, formerly
known as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of
1986. The purpose of Proposition 65 was to allow members of the
public to sue water polluters because government investigation and
prosecution were perceived as ineffectual or inadequate. Consumer
Cause's notice asserted that since October 9, 1994, seventy-eight
specified Shell and Texaco gas stations in Los Angeles and Ventura
Counties had been polluting local groundwater by discharging
benzene, lead, and toluene into the soil beneath their facilities.
Rather than seek clarification of the Proposition 65 notice, Equilon
Enterprises, L.L.C. ("Equilon")-the successor-in-interest to Shell and
Texaco, Inc.-filed a lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief
against Consumer Cause on December 17, 1998. Equilon sought a
judicial declaration that Consumer Cause's Proposition 65 notice
failed to comply with notice requirements of the California Code of
Regulations. Equilon also sought to enjoin Consumer Cause from
filing a Proposition 65 enforcement action. Defendant Consumer
Cause asked the court to strike Equilon's complaint because it violated
the statutory prohibition on "SLAPP" suits. The trial court dismissed
Equilon's action and Equilon appealed.
The court held that (1) the notice sent by Consumer Cause under
Proposition 65 fell squarely within the type of constitutional speech or
right to petition protected by the SLAPP statute; and (2) a reasonable
probability that Equilon would prevail on its claims did not exist.
The applicable California law states a lawsuit that effectively
curtails a person's right to petition or free speech is subject to a special
motion to strike. The court acknowledged that the moving party must
meet two requirements, if it files a special motion to strike. First, the
court must determine whether the moving party satisfied its burden of
showing the lawsuit fell within the class of suits covered by California
Civil Procedure laws. Second, the court must determine whether the
party bringing the suit established a likely probability that it would
prevail on its claim.
Regarding the first requirement for a special motion to strike, the
court stated that a party invoking SLAPP statute protection must show
that it made a statement against its opponent either (a) in connection
with an issue of public interest; or (b) in connection with a legislative,
executive, judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, regardless of whether the statement concerned an
issue of public interest. The court held Consumer Cause satisfied the
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threshold requirements.
First, the court determined Consumer
Cause's notice addressed a health issue that constituted a matter of
indisputable public interest and significance because the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act concerned the quality and
safety of the state's drinking water supply. Second, the court found
the notice was part of a proceeding, as authorized by law, because the
mandated sixty-day notice was generated in connection with the
proposed lawsuit, which constituted an official proceeding.
The court held Consumer Cause satisfied the second requirement
to secure a dismissal under the special motion to strike. The court
determined Equilon had not established a probability that it would
prevail on its claim. Equilon claimed Consumer Cause did not serve
notice on the proper parties and the notice did not provide sufficient
specific information for each gas station regarding the nature of the
alleged discharge and the identification of the alleged drinking water
sources. The court, however, concluded declaratory and injunctive
relief were not proper remedies for a party who received a Proposition
65 notice of intent to sue. The court found Equilon could have raised
a deficient notice defense to an enforcement action, and the
Proposition 65 notice was absolutely privileged. The court asserted
that allowing Proposition 65 private enforcers to be sued before they,
themselves, decide to bring suit would seriously undermine the goals
of the state initiative. The court noted that such "chilling effect"
would thwart the goal of public participation and prevent some citizen
and environmental groups from alerting government officials of water
pollution violations.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision because (1)
Consumer Cause established a prima facie case that it was sued by
Equilon after exercising its First Amendment right to petition the
government in connection with a public issue-conduct protected by
both California law and the SLAPP statute; and (2) the oil companies
were unlikely to prevail on their claims. Additionally, the court stated
that Consumer Cause could bring a motion in the trial court to
recover the attorney fees and costs incurred while appealing this case.
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McNee v. Town of Newton Conservation Comm'n, No.
CV000338817S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3178 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 27, 2000) (holding an inland wetlands agency has discretion to
determine whether to conduct a public hearing before issuing a
permit, and a decision to issue a permit is not rendered void by the
agency's failure to provide notice to nearby landowners nor by
applicant's failure to obtain a discharge permit prior to the agency's
decision).

